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Weakness of will is a commonly discussed topic both colloquially and in the world of 
philosophy. Philosophers of action and of mind have attempted to explain the mechanisms by 
which weakness of will occurs, and what allows an agent to be deemed weak-willed. However, 
an important aspect of weakness of will is also the stigma that comes along with the charge. We 
seek to avoid weakness of will, and look down on those who fall victim to it regularly. The 
following is a discourse on a variation of the traditional view of weakness of will, that of akrasia, 
based on claims made by Richard Holton in his work Willing, Wanting, Waiting.
The account of weakness of will that will be argued for in this discourse is modeled after 
Holton's view. The traditional account of weakness of will is as follows: an agent is weak-willed 
on an occasion if and only if the agent does not do that which she believes is best. The agent 
thinks she knows what the best course of action to take is, and knowingly acts against it. Holton, 
on the other hand, argues that the traditional akratic account is flawed. Instead, he argues that an 
agent displays weakness of will when the agent unreasonably revises a resolution to do some 
action (Holton, 2009, p. 78). The agent resolves to act in one way, and in an unreasonable or 
irrational manner breaks the resolution and acts otherwise. The account presented here will build 
off of Holton's account. I will argue that an agent is weak-willed if he unreasonably revises a 
resolution or if he believes that an action is best, knows that if he formed a resolution to perform 
that action then he would follow through, and still does not form the resolution. Individuals are 
weak-willed if they do not follow through with their resolutions or if they do not make a 
resolution when they should. This form of weakness of will should be seen as a positive and 
normative explanation: it is both how people do allocate weakness of will to agents, and how 
people should allocate it. 
The discussion will be outlined in the following way: first, I will explain the philosophical 
notion of intentions. Some considerations for why intentions do exist as mental states will be 
presented, as well as how well they work in philosophy of action. The explanation of intentions 
will lead to how Holton views intentions and how he describes resolutions as stronger versions 
of intentions. Next, Holton's explanation of weakness of will based on breaking resolutions will 
be reviewed, along with how his account may be a more accurate representation than akrasia. 
Then, the history and previous arguments regarding akrasia as weak-willed action will be 
explained including other philosophers' views on akrasia. Moving forward from akrasia, a 
discussion will be presented on the objections to Holton's claim, and on the most powerful 
objection that I will claim necessitates adjusting the account. The new account will be explicated, 
and finally, I will entertain numerous objections to the account and respond to those objections.
I
Intentions are generally understood today in the philosophical literature, though with some 
disagreement. A general understanding of what intentions are can be explained, by Holton, as a 
mental state in which an agent has made up his or her mind as to what to do. In order to form an 
intention to act, an agent must have a belief and a desire. The desire is something the agent wants 
to achieve, and the belief is a mental state describing the way the world is and what to do in 
order to achieve something. In this way, an agent desires to do something, and believes doing 
some action will achieve the desired results. If an agent holds both a belief and a desire, the agent 
can form an intention to act (Holton, 2009, p. 2).
The intentions that are formed by agents have stability. They persist beyond the time of 
being formed, and the length of time they remain depends on the intention, the changing facts of 
the world, and the action itself (Holton, 2009, p. 3). If one intends to pick up her coffee cup, the 
intention will likely only last momentarily – it will no longer be present once the coffee cup is 
lifted. However, if an agent intends to go biking next Friday, then the intention will likely last 
until the time of biking (or if something comes up to change the agent's mind). The intention 
itself, according to Holton, can be seen as a mental state of decision. There is no reason to 
consider the matter of the intention further with the current facts about the world. The agent has 
made a decision and intends to do something. All further deliberation is ended regarding the 
intention until the act is committed or until the facts of the world change. Most often, an 
intention leads to an agent performing some action, and in this way, intentions are controlling.
The key feature of intentions is this stability. Once an intention is formed, an agent will 
usually perform the action. However, sometimes it is rational to change an intention. When 
intending to drive a car to the supermarket, it is a good idea to revise this intention when noticing 
the brake lines in the car have been cut. There needs to be some release from the hold of an 
intention. When is it permissible to revise an intention, and how does one revise an intention? 
What information can play a role in this process? If the car seat is a bit uncomfortable, should the 
intention be revised? If any information allows for the revising of an intention, then intentions do 
not seem to play any helpful, practical role at all. If this were true, any decision to act can be 
reconsidered immediately. The intentions should disarm any information that originally played a 
role in making the intentions – the fact that one only needs a few groceries should not revise the 
intention if that fact led to the intention being formed in the first place (Holton, 2009, p. 3). As 
soon as the intention is formed, all the information that went into forming the intention is 
irrelevant in any kind of reconsideration. All of these concerns regarding revising an intention 
will later be important in Holton's account of resolutions and weakness of will.
The question remains as to why think intentions exist at all. The most important reason is 
that they seem practically valuable. When, for example, we are deciding on what restaurant to 
dine at some evening, it is very helpful to be able to decide on one, intend on going there for the 
rest of the day, and then go there when the time comes. It would be unpleasant if all we thought 
about all day was which restaurant we should go to and continue to deliberate until it is too late 
to make a decision. Agents have a limited amount of cognitive resources and it is highly 
impractical to waste those resources on considering and reconsidering decisions constantly 
(Holton, 2009, p. 5). Further, the whole idea of an intention is to save decisions that are made so 
that plans can be carried out to fulfill the intention. Perhaps later on there will be no time to make 
a decision, and it is best to have a decision ready-made for when the time comes to act. Likewise, 
it is possible that when it comes time to act, the agent knows that he or she will face inclinations 
to the contrary of acting in a certain way. For example, if one needs to complete yard work on 
Sunday despite how hot it will be that day, one may make the intention on Friday to do so on 
Sunday so that the heat does not dissuade the agent from getting the work done. Intentions turn 
out to be useful mental states in practical reasoning and are therefore helpful philosophical tools 
to explain action.
The last case of the usefulness of intentions is defeating contrary inclinations in the future. 
Holton uses this idea to form a different, special kind of intention: resolutions. Resolutions, on 
this account, are meant to be intentions that are formed when one wants to or believes one should 
do something, but realizes that there will be temptations in the future that might prevent one 
from taking the action (Holton, 2009, p. 10). An agent needs to be able to form an intention that 
will fight specific, contrary inclinations that come up before or at the time of performing the 
intended action. These intentions need to stand firm in light of future, specific beliefs (but 
certainly not all beliefs), and will be deemed resolutions.
Exactly what resolutions are other than stronger, contrary inclination defeating intentions is 
unclear. Similarly, what makes these resolutions stronger versions of intentions is not spelled out 
specifically by Holton. If resolutions are strong intentions, where does the strength come from? It 
is possible that Holton regards resolutions as an intention to Φ, and an intention to hold strong to 
that intention. This conception of resolutions does overcomplicate the account, however for the 
present purposes it is enough to hold that resolutions are strong, contrary inclination defeating 
intentions that are used to avoid temptation in the future. Whether resolutions are promises to 
oneself or second order intentions does not matter as long as the resolutions are aimed at helping 
an agent follow through with an intention despite future inclinations.
II
Holton uses the introduction of intentions to bring up an important question that was left 
out. Once an agent forms an intention, how is it implemented? It seems clear that when one 
discusses a topic such as weakness of will, a critical step must be how intentions are carried out. 
There is something about failing to carry out some act that one wants to commit that leads to 
weakness of will.
One pre-theoretical and common view on weakness of will is that one intentionally chooses 
the worse course of action despite knowing that it is the worse course and despite having the 
ability to choose the better one. This account of weakness of will seems pretty pervasive in 
society. If an agent knows that eating a salad is a better course of action than eating ribs, and is 
able to choose to eat the salad instead of the ribs, but still eats the ribs, then many observers 
would call this agent weak-willed. She knew the best action to take and deliberately chose 
otherwise despite having the ability to act differently. There is something going wrong with the 
creation or the implementation of an intention to eat the salad, and it seems to be called weakness 
of will.
On the other hand, there is another seemingly common view on weakness of will that 
Holton claims is more widely used. The general notion is that a weak-willed individual is too 
easily distracted or removed from a certain path of action (Holton, 2009, p. 70). More precisely, 
an action is weak-willed if an agent reconsiders an intention too easily. To revisit the previous 
example, if an agent intends to eat the salad, regardless of what she thinks is the best course of 
action, but changes her mind too easily and eats the ribs, she is being weak-willed. This, too, 
seems like an appropriate time to claim she fell victim to weakness of will.
As to which version of weakness of will is a more accurate representation of the 
phenomenon is still up for debate. The first view, often called akrasia, depends only on what 
course of action is reported to be best and what the agent does. The second view, much more 
closely related to Holton's view, depends on what the agent does and the intentions of the agent. 
Much has been written in the philosophical literature about akrasia, but Holton's view stemming 
from intentions is the focus of this discussion.
The earlier explanation on intentions outlines how intentions are action-guiding states that 
are not readily revised which are essential for practical decision making. On this description, 
intentions that are too easily revised are worthless – they do not serve the purpose of holding one 
to a certain action – and intentions that are not revised easily enough are dangerous – agents 
must be able to adjust their actions based on the changing facts of the world. If we are too 
sensitive to unimportant information or too unresponsive to important information, the practical 
purposes of intentions are undermined. Holton seems to say that if one is under-responsive, one 
is senselessly stubborn, and if one is over-responsive, one is weak-willed (Holton, 2009, p. 79). 
Based on this evaluation of intentions, in order to understand Holton's account of weakness of 
will, over-responsiveness must be defined.
Obviously, breaking an intention at all is not necessarily being too responsive. If one intends 
to go to an amusement park on Friday, and on Thursday it burns to the ground in a freak 
thunderstorm, it would be completely understandable to cancel the plans to go - certainly not 
weak-willed. A possible thought here to avoid any needless dwelling on what is over-responsive 
is to use conditional intentions (Holton, 2009, p. 73). If every intention an agent forms is 
conditional, then any time the conditional obtains, the action will be committed, but otherwise, it 
will not. For example, if an agent intends to go to the amusement park on Friday as long as it 
does not burn down on Thursday, there is no apparent need to worry about breaking the intention 
too readily. Any reason to break the intention besides the reasons explained in the conditional 
would be acting over-responsively. However, all of the possible, sensible reasons to break the 
intention cannot by any means be included in a given intention. What if the amusement park 
burns down on Wednesday? What if it is closed due to rain? What if the agent forgot about 
several projects he had to complete? Any intention will not include all of the necessary breaks. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that agents psychologically form intentions with these types of “outs.” 
When one forms an intention, one likely does not think of all the different reasons to break it. 
Instead, one forms plans to complete the intention, but remains responsive to certain changing 
facts and ignores others. It is clear that conditional intentions will not be enough to allow for the 
determination of being over-responsive. 
Holton's method of dealing with how to define over-responsiveness or too readily revising 
intentions is by appealing to Bratman's account (Holton, 2009, p. 75). Bratman claims that it is 
not rational to alter an intention when the reconsideration “exhibits tendencies that it is not 
reasonable for the agent to have” (Bratman, 1987, p.68). This view, at first glance, is too vague. 
What is a reasonable tendency to have? There are many different tendencies under which it is 
reasonable to reconsider an intention such as when the information available changes, when 
suffering will ensue, if the intention can no longer be completed, and many more. How can we 
know all the tendencies that are reasonable for an agent to have? Holton says that the account of 
unreasonably revising an intention needs to be as vague as the term “weakness of will” is 
(Holton, 2009, p. 76). However, with this vagueness, it will be difficult to know exactly when an 
agent can be called weak-willed. At the same time, this vagueness allows for more fluid 
judgments of weakness of will, and might allow different observers to delineate weak-willed 
actions differently.
One possible way of determining which tendencies specifically are reasonable to have is to 
claim that if it is reasonable to reconsider the intention generally, then it is reasonable to 
reconsider on this occasion (Holton, 2009, p. 76). In this way, the tendencies do not matter and 
only the intentions themselves determine whether or not they can be reconsidered. This, though, 
runs into serious problems. For example, suppose one, with no training, constructs a tightrope 
between two buildings and plans to walk across it. As the agent reaches the edge of the tightrope 
to begin walking, she reconsiders her intention to walk across because she wants to do some 
experiments with the rope to see if it can support her weight. This is certainly a rational 
reconsideration. Conversely, if she reaches the edge of the tightrope and reconsiders her intention 
due to sudden fear and anxiety, this is likely not a rational reconsideration because it is an 
unreasonable tendency to have. It is not the intention itself that determines if the reconsideration 
is rational, but rather it is the tendency behind it. Clearly, the tendencies behind a particular 
reconsideration determine whether it is a rational reconsideration based on if the tendency is 
reasonable to have.
In order to fully describe his account, Holton continues by addressing other issues that arise 
with weakness of will in hopes to figure out what tendencies are reasonable to have. A helpful 
thought that Holton has is the distinction between weakness of will and capriciousness (Holton, 
2009, p. 76). It is allowable, it appears, for an individual to be unsettled in regards to where to eat 
dinner one night or a similar small decision. To intend to go to one restaurant and then to 
reconsider over and over cannot be deemed weakness of will. Individuals who are common 
offenders of this sort of intention-breaking cannot have that kind of stigma placed on them. This 
is where the differentiation between weakness of will and capriciousness comes into play. Any 
intention that is broken due to unreasonable tendencies will be termed capriciousness, while any 
resolution broken due to unreasonable tendencies will be termed weakness of will. In this way, 
weak-willed agents are only the ones that break the strongest of intentions, and those who cannot 
stick with small, simple decisions will only be afflicted with being overly capricious. Though 
there will not always be a plain difference between these two charges, the contrary inclination 
defeating nature of resolutions should make it much easier to ascertain which agent is guilty of 
which accusation.
Now there is some progress on Holton's account – we are not talking about intentions, but 
instead resolutions. Even further, consider the following scenario: Jim is a man who is spending 
a lot of time with his wife lately, and is falling behind on his work. He has a realization that he is 
dedicated to too many things. Jim thinks he has too many resolutions and because of it feels too 
busy. He decides that he will randomly choose certain resolutions, and immediately abandon 
them. Is he being weak-willed? The idea here is that Jim should not be called weak-willed when 
the reason he revises his resolutions is due to something irrelevant to the resolutions themselves. 
Weakness of will can only be when the tendency causing the reconsideration is unreasonable for 
the very resolution it is reconsidering (Holton, 2009, p. 78). When randomly choosing and 
abandoning resolutions, this cannot be unreasonable for the resolutions that are abandoned. 
Maybe Jim will be weak-willed by breaking a resolution he has to stick by all of his resolutions, 
if he is a very resolute person, but he is not being weak-willed in regards to breaking his 
resolution to exercise three times every week. This makes the definition of weakness of will as 
an unreasonable revision of a resolution in response to the pressure of the contrary inclinations 
that the resolution is meant to defeat. Tendencies that are unreasonable to have must be the ones 
that are based on the inclinations a resolution is meant to defeat.
There is one problem that Holton's final account of weakness of will should deal with 
before use. How can it be known whether or not a reconsideration is due specifically to the 
inclinations the resolution is meant to defeat? Any causal explanation will not work because 
there can be many strange causal chains from an inclination to the reconsideration without, 
intuitively, the inclinations being the reason for the reconsideration (Holton, 2009, p. 76). Holton 
claims that the account can be understood well enough to be used without answering this 
question, though it is not clear that this account is viable without an explanation to how one 
knows that the inclination causes the reconsideration. Perhaps, as with the vagueness of 
“reasonable tendencies,” a subjectivity in whether or not the contrary inclinations defeat the 
resolution will allow for normal disagreements in discerning who is being weak-willed.
III
Now that Holton's account of weakness of will has been explained, it is necessary to quickly 
address the opposing view of weakness of will, and the discussion and disagreement that 
surrounds it. The classical account of weakness of will is akrasia, and an agent is weak-willed on 
this account when she does what she does not judge best to do. On first thought, this view seems 
very accurate to what society calls weakness of will. For example, a smoker might know that it 
would be best if he did not smoke, and yet he continues to do so. One might call this smoker 
weak-willed for not stopping even though he knows it is best to stop. The addiction forces him to 
continue, and he is said to be weak because of it. 
Other examples, though, do not fit as well with akrasia. If Harris decides it would be best to 
go bike riding on Friday regardless of the weather, but then Friday comes and it is raining 
outside so he does not go, he, too, can be called weak-willed through akrasia. He does not do 
what he judges to be best. However, this is where philosophers begin to disagree. If Harris 
decided not to go bike riding because it was raining, then he did not judge bike riding as the best 
course of action to take. Instead, the best thing to do was to not go bike riding. Therefore, Harris 
is not being akratic and not being weak-willed. For R. M. Hare, this form of weakness of will is 
impossible: akrasia does not occur (Hare, 1952, p. 169). That which an agent does determines 
that which the agent judges as best. It is impossible, on this view, for one to judge action A as 
best and to perform action B. If one continues to smoke and fall victim to the addiction, then one 
judges the continuation of smoking as the best course of action given the circumstances. 
Obviously this agent does not believe that smoking is what is best for her health, that it is best for 
her breath, or that it is best for her psychological well-being. But overall, if she continues to 
smoke, she believes smoking is the best action to take. On this view, there is no way to call 
someone weak-willed based on akrasia. 
Davidson replies to this position by drawing a distinction between an “all things 
considered” judgment, and an “all-out” judgment (Davidson, 1970, p. 41). Davidson claims that 
any piece of evidence r may tell an agent that action A is better than B. This one dimensional 
preference is in no way binding, instead it is only a single way in which A is considered better 
than B. There are many different ways to compare two actions, and all of the individual 
preferences can be added up. For example, smoking may be considered better than not smoking 
because it helps keep one's weight lower and eases one's anxiety, but not smoking may be 
considered better than smoking because it is cheaper and better for one's health. If all of the 
preferences are added up, one can come up with an “all things considered preference” for one 
action rather than another. All things considered, an agent judges A as preferable to B. This, 
though, is still not an all-out belief regarding the two actions, it is only in light of all the available 
evidence collected so far. One can still choose to do B despite, all things considered, A is 
preferable. Due to the judgments being relational, one does not form an all-out belief, only that 
prima facie, in all these ways considered, A is better than B. It is still irrational to do B when A is 
judged to be better, claims Davidson, because the evidence supports action A. But, it is not 
impossible to do so, though it is impossible to all-out believe that A is better than B and perform 
action B (Davidson, 1970, p. 42). Agents will always perform the action that they all-out believe 
to be best. When discussing akrasia, agents are working in practical rationality and adding up 
evidence, not necessarily coming to an all-out conclusion. On this view, akrasia survives Hare's 
attack, and akrasia is a form of irrationality upon which weakness of will is defined. 
IV
Weakness of will defined as akrasia does not feel quite accurate, and in this section I will 
present several problems with the akratic account that Holton's view seems to get right. Consider 
the following: Sarah considers herself a fairly healthy person, but knows that she has a sweet 
tooth. She always thinks to herself that it would really be best for her, all things considered, to 
stop eating all cakes and cookies. She is handed a piece of cake at a birthday party, and knowing 
that it would be best to not eat the cake, she has some anyway. While enjoying her dessert, she is 
asked by a friend why she decided to eat the cake, and to that she responds that she does not 
know. Should Sarah be considered weak-willed? I would like to say no – she never decided not 
to eat the cake, she just thought it would be best for her not to. Yes, she is being irrational or 
inconsistent by going against her best judgment, but she is not weak-willed – she has not willed 
to do anything!
Similarly, with the smoking example, if an agent judges it best not to smoke, but decides to 
continue smoking because she wants to, then she certainly is not being weak-willed. This agent is 
being inconsistent in light of her actions not matching up with her judgments, but she is not 
weak-willed until she decides to stop and does not follow through. The judgment alone is not 
enough to cause someone to be weak-willed: a decision has to be made. 
Not every example of weakness of will can be explained by akrasia, but every example of 
akrasia that does explain weakness of will can also be explained by Holton's account. In the 
biking example, Harris was akratic because he judged it best to go biking while he still did not 
go because it was raining. Similarly, Harris made the decision (or a resolution) to go biking even 
if it is raining, and revises his resolution for the very inclinations it was meant to defeat. Harris is 
weak-willed on both the akrasia account and Holton's account.
The feeling, alone, that akrasia misses the mark is not enough to dismiss the account. There 
are several other problems on which the account fails. Firstly, akrasia has problems dealing with 
indifference (Holton, 2009, p. 79). Gabe wants to go buy some cereal, and needs to decide 
between Loopy O's and Sugar Crunch. The cereals are of very similar quality, and neither seems 
much better than the other. Gabe has no preference whatsoever between the two. However, he 
will be in a big hurry when he gets to the supermarket, so he must decide now and be sure of his 
choice. He chooses to buy Sugar Crunch, and is so sure of his choice (he really does not want to 
waste a moment) that he resolves to buy Sugar Crunch even if he sees Loopy O's first. All day 
before going to the supermarket he is very confident that he will get Sugar Crunch, but when he 
does finally get there and sees Loopy O's first, he revises his resolution and buys the Loopy O's. 
He concludes he may as well abandon his resolution. In this case, Gabe is weak-willed but not 
akratic. He made no judgment as to what is best, but resolved to buy the Sugar Crunch and did 
not follow through due to the inclinations he was trying to avoid. If one of his friends knew the 
situation and what Gabe planned but failed to do, the friend would call Gabe weak-willed.
Holton also describes oscillating weakness of will as a reason to abandon the akrasia view 
(Holton, 2009, p. 80). His example is from Thomas Schelling and involves a young boy who 
wants to be an explorer who will have to deal with terribly cold environments (Schelling, 1980, 
p.59). In order to prepare himself, every night the boy resolves to sleep without a blanket so that 
he can be cold as he sleeps. However, in the middle of the night, the boy feels the cold that he 
thought he wanted, ineffectively reaches for a blanket, and resolves to wear the blanket the 
following night even if he wants to be cold to prepare for the arctic weather. This cycle repeats 
itself over and over. Intuitively, one would likely call the boy weak-willed on both occasions: 
when he does not wear a blanket even though he resolved to wear it earlier, and when he resolves 
to wear the blanket the next night when he resolved that he would not. It is easy for Holton's 
account to accommodate this situation because the boy is breaking resolutions because of the 
inclinations they were meant to defeat: being cold and being comfortable, respectively. Akrasia, 
Holton claims, can only account for one of the occurrences of weakness of will. Either, the boy 
judges its best to leave the blanket on or to leave it off. If he judges it best to leave it on, he is 
being weak-willed only when he leaves it off at bedtime and not when he reaches for it at night, 
and if he juedges it best to leave it off, he is being weak-willed reaching for it in the middle of 
the night and not when he leaves it off going to bed. Those who believe akrasia is the correct 
account could try to save their view by arguing the boy is not weak-willed when he goes to bed, 
because he is in the right state of mind (whatever that is meant to mean) while his judgment is 
flawed in the middle of the night. However, this requires much further explanation to the 
traditional akratic account and until then, akrasia is not equivalent to weakness of will in this 
case.
There are many further examples of weakness of will without akrasia, according to Holton. 
The perfect recipe for this to occur is when an agent resolves to do something that he judges as 
not the best thing to do (Holton, 2009, p. 84). Once this resolution is formed for the worse action, 
when the resolution is broken in an unreasonable way, then the agent will not be akratic but will 
be considered weak-willed. The agent will do that action that he considers best, but will also be 
unreasonably revising a resolution. One example of this is Holton's adaptation of a story by 
Godden (Godden, 1975). Essentially, a man has devoted his life to art, but he ends up getting 
married and having a child. He resolves to always protect the child despite art still being the best 
thing to pursue. When he is confronted with the choice of giving up art and protecting the child 
or giving up the child and being free to pursue his artistic dreams, he chooses the art. Though he 
is not falling victim to akrasia, he is still being weak-willed.
The strongest argument against akrasia as being weakness of will is how the stigma of 
weakness of will is allocated (Holton, 2009, p. 82). Holton uses this argument to illustrate that 
the decision in any action is most important for determining weakness of will, not the judgment. 
The example that is presented is that of a man who judges it is best to not eat meat any longer. 
Though he has this belief, he still can be found eating meat consistently. When asked why he 
does this he says that he is “inconsistent.” This man does not appear to be weak-willed. 
However, if this man judges that it is best to stop eating meat, and resolves that starting on 
January 1st, he will stop, then on January 2nd if he is eating meat he does seem to be weak-
willed. What is going on here? Even if he makes the resolution on December 1st to stop eating 
meat on January 1st, and all throughout the month of December he knows it is best to stop eating 
meat but he continues, he is not weak-willed. As soon as January 1st comes, though, he is weak-
willed when he eats meat. There is something going on with making the decision to take some 
action that causes the change for weakness of will. The judgment that one action is better than 
another is not enough to cause an agent to be worthy of the stigma. The stigma can only be 
charged to an agent when the agent made some resolution and falls short. Holton says that the 
stigma of weakness of will illustrates that akrasia is not weakness of will while his account can 
explain the phenomenon precisely.
V
The akrasia account falls short of accurately describing weakness of will, while Holton's 
account appears to approximate our intuitions about when one is weak-willed. The Holton 
account is far from perfect, though. In this section I will describe several objections to the Holton 
account, and will end with an objection that, as I will explain, requires a response that Holton 
does not provide.
The first objection that Holton entertains is the charge that perhaps this description of 
weakness of will is too strict (Holton, 2009, p. 86). It may miss cases of weakness of will and 
those cases might be cases in which akrasia does hold. There should be no problem in claiming 
that weakness of will is akrasia and is also how Holton describes it. Could this not be the case? 
Holton merely cites his previous examples to explain how akrasia gives no help to weakness of 
will. However, as I will discuss later on, this will turn out to be a form of the most damaging 
objection to Holton's account: there are occasions where an agent is weak-willed but is not 
unreasonably revising a resolution. Holton even refers to the problem in this section without ever 
addressing it, speaking of agents who are socially weak-willed. He says, in regards to weak-
willed people in social interactions being unable to form resolutions in the first place, “perhaps 
they are so weak-willed that they never think to form them.” Holton seems to be implying that 
not forming a resolution in itself might be weak-willed, but his account as described cannot 
accommodate this reality. This is where the adjusted account will come into play.
Another objection to the Holton account is that it cannot deal with disagreements among 
people in determining what is weakness of will and what is not (Holton, 2009, p. 89). Akrasia 
has no trouble doing this. Since one is being weak-willed if one acts against what one judges to 
be best, then depending on what an observer thinks that the individual judges to be best, one may 
or may not be called weak-willed. One observer may think the agent thought it would be best to 
do A, while another observer may think the agent thought it would be best to do B, so when the 
agent does A, the observers disagree about the agent's weakness of will status. Holton insists that 
his account can allow for disagreements, as well. Observers could disagree on whether or not the 
revision to the resolution that the agent made was due to the contrary inclinations it was meant to 
defeat or not. Similarly, observers could disagree if the revision made to the resolution was one 
that is reasonable or not even if it was due to the contrary inclinations. This leaves room for 
plenty of disagreement.
Policy resolutions, also, can give Holton's account trouble (Holton, 2009, p. 91). Suppose 
Nancy has the judgment that it is always best to do her errands before eating lunch. One day, she 
decides to go against her best judgment and eat lunch first. This is considered akrasia and would 
be weakness of will on that account. However, for Holton, if she made the resolution to always 
do errands before eating lunch, she does not seem to break the resolution, she just is not 
following it on this occasion and is not weak-willed. Holton's response to this objection is that 
Nancy, in fact, is breaking her resolution. She revises it to be that she will always do her errands 
before eating lunch except today. If her resolution was meant to defeat feeling hungry and she 
eats lunch first on this day due to hunger, then she is being unreasonable in revising her 
resolution. She would be weak-willed. Breaking policy resolutions one time is essentially 
revising the resolution.
Jamie Swann also objects to Holton's account of weakness of will and argues that it is 
unnecessary if one redefines akrasia into not doing what one judges best because one judges it to 
be best (Swann, unpublished). This, it is argued, allows for there to be no weakness of will 
without akrasia, and avoids the need for Holton's conception. On this view, an agent could do 
that which she judges best, but if it is due to an unreasonable revision of a resolution, she will not 
do it because she judges it best. She will revise her resolution because her nerve fails, because 
she gets scared, or she will not be able to explain it at all. Any unreasonable revision of a 
resolution will never be judged as the best thing to do, so this account strengthens an akrasia 
based weakness of will. Holton's response to this criticism is that the adjusted akrasia account 
still does not accommodate many cases of weakness of will. The reason resolutions are often 
made is because desires or beliefs may change at the time of action, and resolutions stick agents 
to their paths. Bob might make the resolution not to do stupid things while drinking, for fear that 
when he drinks he might hurt himself. He may feel he is able to curtail this behavior by having a 
resolution in place. Once he is inebriated, Bob's opinions on what is best to do have changed: he 
judges it best to do something stupid. Bob performs this stupid action, and does it because he 
thinks it is what is best to do. On the adjusted akrasia account, Bob is not weak-willed, but it 
intuitively seems that he is weak-willed in deciding not to do stupid things and yet still doing 
them. Holton's account handles Bob well, while Swann's account still does not. 
The final objection, and the most damaging, stems from the first objection discussed. The 
charge against Holton is that his account is too weak and does not cover all weak-willed actions. 
The objection comes from Kingsley Amis's novel Lucky Jim, and is an example of an agent, Jim, 
who is too afraid of breaking a resolution to even form one in the first place (Amis, 1956). Jim 
burns clothes that were lent to him by his superior in academia, and knows that his superior will 
fire him if he does not confess to what he has done. However, Jim also knows that if he makes 
the resolution to confess, he will not follow through with it. Jim knows that it would be best to 
confess, but cannot, and knows that even if he resolved to, he would not. Jim is being weak-
willed. The akrasia account easily handles this case: Jim judges it best to confess and he does not 
do so. Holton's account, conversely, does not appear to deal with Jim appropriately. Jim makes 
no resolution, and therefore Jim cannot be called weak-willed. 
The response Holton gives to this criticism is wholly unsatisfying. What Holton wonders is 
why Jim does not make the resolution in the first place. He is afraid that if he makes the 
resolution, he still would not be able to follow through. To Jim, making a resolution is worthless 
because it only leads to his unreasonable revision of a resolution that was made in order to defeat 
his fear. He knows his fear will overcome him and his resolution will be revised. Holton claims 
that Jim's fear of weakness of will is what prevents his resolution from being formed (Holton, 
2009, p. 88). He says that Jim is someone that tends to be weak-willed and this is why he does 
not form the resolution. Holton states, “So, on the account given here, his weakness of will 
explains his action (or rather his inaction). It seems to me that is good enough.” Jim's action can 
be explained by Holton's account of weakness of will, though his action does not show that he is 
weak-willed. His action gives the observer insight as to Jim's personality, but the action is not a 
weak-willed one. 
Holton's response is a squirming attempt to dodge the criticism, but his account will not 
survive this objection without adjustment. There are two major problems with Holton's reply. 
Firstly, Jim is not necessarily a weak-willed person, he is only being weak-willed on this 
occasion. It is unfair to rely on Jim's chronic weakness of will to explain this occurrence, because 
if this is a viable option, any example of weakness of will can be explained by the weak-willed 
agent. It is possible that anyone in Jim's position would act the way he did, weak-willed or not. It 
seems as though Jim should have formed a resolution, but failed to do so. The action he should 
have taken would do no harm and could only have helped him. It is in Jim's best interest, and yet 
he neglects to form the resolution. Jim's tendency towards weakness of will is not enough to 
explain this action.
Secondly, even given that Jim has been weak-willed in the past, he cannot be called weak-
willed here on Holton's view. No matter how Jim would have acted had he made a resolution, he 
did not make a resolution and cannot be called weak-willed. Because Jim never made a decision, 
he does not deserve to have the stigma allocated to him, according to Holton's own view. Further, 
it is Jim's fear of the stigma of weakness of will that prevents him from forming a resolution, not 
weakness of will itself. His weak-willed nature does not even prevent him from forming a 
resolution, it would only cause him to fail at following through. It is possible that Jim only thinks 
he has been weak-willed in the past, but he is wrong. In fact, Jim has never been weak-willed. 
Holton cannot claim that his weak-willed personality causes the inaction nor can he say that the 
action itself is weak-willed. The irrational fear of weakness of will alone prevents him from 
forming the resolution. 
Holton's account clearly needs something to help deal with this case. This type of case can 
arise all of the time: anytime one should form a resolution but does not due to any reason. Not 
making resolutions when it appears that one should seems like weakness of will. To make this 
point stronger, I will grant Holton the case of Jim Dixon and say that his previous weakness of 
will explains his current action (even to the point of making it weak-willed itself). The question 
is, can there be a case in which an agent has a belief and a desire sufficient to form a resolution, 
and thinks that if the resolution is formed, the agent will follow through with the resolution, yet 
still does not form the resolution in the first place? This would be a far more problematic case for 
Holton's account and likely a case that could not be dismissed. This would be a case in which the 
agent would be considered weak-willed (like Jim), however there is no resolution formed that 
can be unreasonably revised, and there is no fear of weakness of will preventing the agent from 
forming the resolution. If this is the case, Holton cannot claim that the agent is being weak-
willed on his account, and his view will require revision.
At this point I will turn back to the case of the meat eater. Marissa often eats meat, but has 
recently realized that it would be best to stop eating meat and to become a vegetarian. She has a 
belief - “it would be best if I stop eating meat and if I do stop, I will be a vegetarian” - and a 
desire - “I would like to stop eating meat and be a vegetarian.” Marissa also believes, “If I set out 
to be a vegetarian, I know I will follow through with it.” She believes this because she is the type 
of person that almost always follows through with her resolutions. Marissa wants to be a 
vegetarian, thinks it is best for her to be a vegetarian, and knows that if she sets out to be one, she 
will become one. Yet, she does not do it. The reasons Marissa gives for not forming the 
resolution vary; she says that she is inconsistent, lazy, and indifferent towards making a 
resolution. Is Marissa being weak-willed by not taking any action in regards to her beliefs and 
desires? It certainly appears so. There seems to be nothing stopping her from forming the 
resolution and becoming a vegetarian, and she still does not do it. She almost seems as weak-
willed as the agent who claims that he will stop eating meat on January 1st but still continues to 
do so.
Holton has two possible responses to this example. One possible response is to bite the 
bullet and accept the consequences of his account. Marissa is not weak-willed because she does 
not form a resolution, and her action cannot be explained by her fear of being weak-willed. She 
does not deserve the stigma of weakness of will. Though this response allows Holton's view to 
remain as it stands, it makes his account much weaker. There are a whole class of actions that 
would commonly be called weak-willed and Holton must insist that they are not. This basically 
undermines much of what Holton is trying to do in forming a positivist account of weakness of 
will in which he attempts to mirror how observers actually do charge agents with being weak-
willed. Furthermore, this only lends more credit to the akrasia account due to akrasia easily 
explaining Marissa's inaction as weakness of will. This does not seem like a good response for 
Holton to make.
The other response Holton can make is that Marissa is in fact being weak-willed. The 
resolution she is breaking is her resolution to make resolutions when they are needed. Marissa is 
confronted with a situation in which she should have made a resolution, she unreasonably 
revised her resolution to make resolutions, and is therefore weak-willed. Her resolution to make 
resolutions, which must be an overarching, life-long resolution, might be something like she is  
resolving to form a resolution when in a situation in which she knows what action is best to take, 
she wants to complete that action, and she knows that if she made a resolution to complete that 
action, she would follow through. This resolution would also have to defeat the contrary 
inclinations of feeling indifferent or inconsistent. In this way, Marissa unreasonably revised her 
resolution to form resolutions, and on Holton's account, is weak-willed. A response like this one, 
however, does not seem to be in the spirit of Holton's account. Holton says that Jim does not 
break any resolution when he fails to form one to confess, and so it seems as if Holton does not 
believe in this type of life-long, implied resolution. Without those underlying resolutions, Holton 
will only be able to bite the bullet in Marissa's situation.
VI
Instead of trying to skirt this example, it would be best for Holton to accept that there is a 
problem with his account, and adjust accordingly. I propose that weakness of will is not only 
when an agent unreasonably revises a resolution, but also when an agent unreasonably fails to 
form a resolution. To put this into Holton's terminology, it is weak-willed to fail to form a 
resolution due to a tendency that it is unreasonable to have. This allows for a similar definition as 
Holton's original conception of weakness of will. The same constraints will be used on formed 
resolutions as on unformed resolutions: if a formed resolution is abandoned or if a resolution is 
not formed due to a tendency it is unreasonable to have, then the agent is being weak-willed.
The tendencies that are unreasonable to have in revising a resolution have already been 
discussed, but the question remains as to what tendencies are unreasonable to have in not 
forming a resolution. When an agent deems it best to Φ, has a belief and a desire sufficient to 
form a resolution to Φ, and believes that if the agent made a resolution to Φ, the agent would 
follow through, it is unreasonable to not form a resolution. Any tendency that prevents a 
resolution from being made in this case is unreasonable. 
I will quickly return to the case of Marissa. She believes it is best to be a vegetarian. She 
has a belief and a desire sufficient to form a resolution to stop eating meat. She believes that if 
she forms the resolution to stop eating meat, she really will stop. Therefore, any tendency that 
leads her to not forming the resolution, be it laziness, inconsistency, or anything else, will be an 
unreasonable tendency to have and she will be charged with being weak-willed.
VII
My view on weakness of will has now been established. Unreasonably revising a resolution 
or unreasonably failing to form one are both weak-willed actions. In this section, I will entertain 
some criticisms of my view and respond to those criticisms.
Some, specifically from Holton's school of thought, will argue that the example of Marissa 
described earlier is not a realistic situation. The description is illegitimate and therefore, Holton's 
model does not have to be changed. If an agent deems an action best to do, and has a belief and a 
desire sufficient for forming a resolution, then the agent will either form the resolution and 
follow through, or the agent in fact believes that if a resolution is formed, it will be revised 
unreasonably. This puts the example in the same place that Jim was in. Either Jim will make the 
resolution and will follow through with it, or Jim is afraid that if he makes the resolution, he will 
be weak-willed, and so weakness of will (on Holton's account) explains his action. In essence, 
this criticism is general skepticism regarding my example.
There is no response to this objection other than a foot stamp and an insistent glare. It seems 
utterly obvious that situations like these come up all of the time. Perhaps a more poignant 
example would be of Ted during tax time: Ted wants to get started on his taxes very badly. He 
believes that doing his taxes now, ahead of time, would be best. Ted also thinks that if he only 
made a resolution to sit down and do his taxes, he certainly would. Every time in the past that 
Ted made the resolution to do his taxes, he has followed through. Yet, Ted, knowing all of these 
facts very well, finds himself seated and watching television. He makes no plans to get started on 
his taxes or even move from his seat. He has no reason to continue watching television, and 
continues to feel guilty knowing that he should do his taxes and if he decided to he would. It 
really seems that situations like these arise often and that Ted is being weak-willed. How to 
prove that these situations really do exist relies solely on our intuition. Even though no one like 
Ted “comes to mind” for Holton, I insist that these circumstances are not very rare (Holton, 
2009, p. 88). 
Holton supporters could also argue that this example does, in fact, occur, but it is not 
weakness of will. Something is going on in these examples, but whatever it is, it is not weak-
willed action. Weak-willed action is only unreasonably revising a resolution. Further, 
unreasonably revising a resolution is so different and distinct from failing to form a resolution 
that the two cannot be considered the same phenomenon. This other intuitive charge that one 
might want to give to Ted or Marissa is not weakness of will, it is something else that is being 
confused and confounded with weakness of will. 
Prima facie, this idea seems plainly false. However, to soothe the minds of strong Holton 
supporters, I can call this phenomenon shmeakness of shmill. Shmeakness of shmill should not 
be confused with weakness of will, and occurs when an agent unreasonably fails to form a 
resolution when the agent should. The common notion of weakness of will and the akratic notion 
of weakness of will both encompass shmeakness of shmill, and would charge that someone who 
displays shmeak-shmilled action is also being weak-willed. Furthermore, even those who support 
Holton's unadjusted view on weakness of will would agree that a weak-willed person has the 
tendency to manifest weakness of will and shmeakness of shmill. I would like to contend that 
given shmeakness of shmill and weakness of will are so intimately tied together that it does not 
make sense to talk about weakness of will without mentioning shmeakness of shmill. Also, my 
goal here is to elucidate weakness of will philosophically and to capture its intuitive, stigma-
filled notion in the real world. Making such a small differentiation between weakness of will and 
shmeakness of shmill, then, is unnecessary, and for the matter of this discussion, will be ignored.
Others may contend that this account is not significantly different from the original akrasia 
account. On this account, we are appealing to what the agent judges as best to do to determine 
weakness of will. The agent judges it best to Φ and yet does not form a resolution to Φ. Using a 
more lenient form of akrasia, is this agent not just being akratic? However, this is a stretch from 
forming the resolution to Φ to actually Φing. To make this argument stronger, I will assume that 
many people from Holton's camp and in the akrasia camp are willing to grant that not forming 
the resolution to Φ is as weak-willed as not Φing outright on the akrasia account. If this adjusted 
version of Holton's weakness of will is not very different from the akrasia view, it might just be 
easiest, as Amelie Rorty might support, to simply add akrasia to Holton's account (Rorty, 1980).
Holton himself tries to avoid this argument earlier, and uses the reply that akrasia obtains 
numerous unintuitive examples of weakness of will, whereas his account meshes well with how 
individuals allocate the stigma. However, in this case the problem is not with Holton's account, 
but moreover it is with using what the agent judges as best in an explanation of weakness of will 
without appealing to akrasia. The key response here is that not only is the agent not doing what 
he judges best, but the agent thinks that he would follow through with a resolution if he were to 
make one. Akrasia is not enough to define someone as weak-willed in the cases where a 
resolution is not formed. Holton has described numerous cases of agents who display akrasia but 
not weakness of will, and the same cases apply when a resolution is not formed while the agent 
is akratic. What is important here is that the agent believes that if she made a resolution, then she 
would follow through with it. Otherwise, not doing what she judges best is just being 
inconsistent with her beliefs, not being weak-willed.
The last criticism I will discuss is a possible response by Holton to eliminate the danger of 
the first example of Marissa that seems to force him into a corner. Marissa's example is meant to 
illustrate that an agent can fail to form a resolution and still be weak-willed. Holton's account 
does not accommodate this possibility unless the agent believes that she will not act on the 
resolution even if she makes one. This is the justification that I have used for adjusting Holton's 
version of weakness of will. However, it is possible for Holton to have a reply to the 
counterexample that may save his project. Holton might say that what is needed in this account 
of weakness of will is not an addition to what qualifies a person as weak-willed, but instead we 
must suppose that individuals may have a resolution to form resolutions when they should. If 
Holton is under the impression that these types of resolutions exist, then when one should form a 
resolution and does not (which seems to be the case in all of these examples of weakness of will 
without a resolution being formed), one is breaking an overarching resolution and being weak-
willed. What still needs to be determined is when one “should” form a resolution.
To flesh out this assumption needed to avoid the counterexample, Holton must explain 
when an agent should form a resolution. The easiest response to this would be the same 
normative requirements placed on the adjusted Holton account. One should form a resolution 
when one thinks that a certain action is best, and believes that if a resolution was made to carry 
out that action it would be followed through. The more elaborate account that is explained in this 
discussion would then be simply unnecessary. All that is needed is the understanding that 
resolutions to make resolutions exist, and those are the resolutions broken in the cases of 
weakness of will where resolutions are not formed. 
To respond to this objection, it needs to be made clear who has a resolution to form 
resolutions when one should. If it is only the people who get themselves into situations in which 
they judge an action to be best, believe that if they made a resolution they would carry it out, and 
still don't make a resolution, then this objection appears weak and rather ad hoc. The resolution 
to form resolutions itself is worthless if only people who break the resolution to form resolutions 
form the resolution. The people who have a tendency to not form resolutions when they should 
are the only people to form the resolution to form resolutions, and therefore the resolution is 
made only to be broken. If it is never broken, then they never had the resolution. It is as if these 
resolutions are placed in the minds of only the people who fail to form resolutions when they 
should at the time that they are weak-willed and not forming the resolution. If this is the case, 
Holton is picking and choosing who to give this resolution to: only if they should form a 
resolution and do not. Even worse for this objection, when do these agents form this resolution? 
Resolution generation seems to be a fairly conscious process most of the time, with specific 
goals in mind for the agent generating the resolutions. Do the agents know beforehand that they 
are going to get into a situation in which they judge an action best and believe that if they formed 
a resolution they would follow through, but still will not form one? Does this resolution ever 
help an agent form a resolution when he should? If it does, then maybe Holton can say that 
everyone has a resolution to form resolutions, not just those who fail to form resolutions when 
they should. That way, the people who are not weak-willed can be explained as such by showing 
how they form resolutions easily with the overarching resolution, and the people who are weak-
willed in the cases where they should form a resolution but do not are in fact breaking a 
resolution. This would allow Holton's account to explain weak-willed failure to form resolutions.
This second option – that all agents always have a resolution to form resolutions when they 
should – is also doomed to failure. The most powerful reason this appears to be false is because it 
simply does not seem like we have resolutions to form resolutions. Though it is not contradictory 
for there to be unconscious resolutions that we follow, it still seems as if these resolutions are 
assigned to us after the fact. We need some way to explain why people are weak-willed when 
they do not form a resolution in a way that illustrates they are breaking some resolution. 
Furthermore, as questioned earlier, when is the resolution to form resolutions formed? If it is 
formed at birth, it is no longer coherent because infants certainly do not know what a resolution 
is, understand that they will have contrary inclinations that they will want to defeat, or have any 
reason to want to stay resolute. If the resolution to form resolutions is formed later in life, what 
triggers it to be formed and how can one be sure that every agent forms the resolution? Even if it 
is the case that people have these resolutions, why does Holton not bring this up in regards to Jim 
Dixon? He could assert that given a case of an individual who judges an action best and thinks 
she will follow through with a resolution if she made one but does not make it is being weak-
willed by breaking the resolution to form resolutions. It seems against the spirit of Holton to 
claim that all agents have a resolution to form resolutions when they should.
Yet, if one can accept that these resolutions really do exist in all agents, and we accept that 
this response is not against the spirit of what Holton is trying to accomplish, this may be a 
worthwhile objection to the account presented. If this is the case, then it may be possible for 
Holton to argue that the adjustment to his account is unnecessary: all that is needed is an 
explication of a single resolution constraint on rational agency. When laying out his account, he 
would need to mention that all agents have a resolution to form resolutions when they should. 
This would avoid all of the problems with the Marissa example.
I contend that if Holton takes this point of view, his new account and the adjusted account 
presented here are essentially identical explanations of weakness of will. While Holton will 
explain the cases of weakness of will without an apparent resolution by using resolutions, the 
account presented here explains the same episodes of weakness of will with a normative 
requirement to form resolutions when one should. Holton has the requirement come from within 
the agent, while this account places the requirement outside of the agent and on agency as a 
whole. But, both views exemplify the same account of weakness of will and allocate the stigma 
of the charge identically. In fact, the change Holton would have to make to his account by 
including resolutions to form resolutions is only transforming Holton's account into the one 
presented. His account is not fully explained until he mentions that resolutions to form 
resolutions are included, and therefore, without that change or without using the adjusted account 
presented, Holton's account falls short of accurately depicting weakness of will.
Conclusion
I presented an adjusted account of Richard Holton's understanding of weakness of will. The 
account I uphold is similar to Holton's account in as much as it relies on resolutions and 
unreasonable revisions to them. However, I offer an additional criterion to evaluating an agent 
for weakness of will: an agent is weak-willed if the agent unreasonably fails to form a resolution. 
Unreasonably failing to form a resolution turns out to be failing to form a resolution when an 
agent judges the action as the best thing to do and the agent believing that if the resolution was 
formed, the agent would follow through. Although it is still unclear how to precisely approach 
the problem of Jim Dixon, the new account greatly strengthens Holton's original conception. 
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